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J. C. LESTER  
A reply to the T. Brooks review of Escape from Leviathan: Liberty, Welfare, and Anarchy 
Reconciled (Macmillan 2000) in the Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2002 (77-
83). 
It is possible to pose many difficult and fascinating problems and criticisms for the various 
theses and arguments in Escape from Leviathan (EFL). This occurred while writing it, and 
various sharp minds did it on reading drafts or the final product. However, some reviews 
misunderstand, or ignore, what is written and reassert conventional views. But it is best to 
answer all published criticisms if only to show how they fail, lest anyone thinks they are sound, 
and even poor criticisms can sometimes elicit elucidation. Thus, we now turn to the review. 
Early on the review states that EFL’s “conservatism runs counter to my socialist disposition” 
(77). Words do not matter too much as long as it is clear what is meant. But it might mislead 
readers if libertarianism is called “conservatism”. There is no significant connection between 
these two ideologies and no explanation is given. Perhaps it is simply an example of the muddle 
that all so-called ‘right-wingers’—EFL is described as, “On the right-hand side of 
libertarianism” (80)—are in some way the same and ‘reactionary’ compared to the supposed 
‘radicalism’ of the so-called ‘left’. However, the review later states that EFL “would greatly 
reshape the structure of the society in which we live” (n. 27). So, what kind of “conservatism” 
is that? (Although it seems more accurate to see libertarianism not as itself out to “reshape” 
society, so much as to stop any proactively-imposed “reshape”.) 
There is a stipulative definition of ‘politics’ in the opening lines of EFL: “By ‘politics’ I mean 
all that, and only what, involves the state”. The review asks, “Do we not have ‘politics’ in other 
places? Such as the workplace or in our family?” (80). No, not by the definition that had just 
been stated. A stipulative definition of the phenomenon that is being addressed is not open to 
questioning in the way that an attempted ‘essentialist’ view of politics would be. EFL is not 
putting forward a theory of ‘what politics is’. Of course, most people are familiar with the 
statist view that ‘everything is political’. This appears to be some combination of being 
tendentious and a conflation of the metaphorical use of the term with its normal sense. This is 
tantamount to an unwitting and confused advocacy of totalitarianism, where everything would 
indeed be political. The review asks, “is not the problem rather of power relationships between 
people rather than always (state) interference?” (80). No, that is not the problem EFL is 
tackling. One key issue in EFL is of interpersonal proactive impositions, and the state is far 
and away the greatest source of these. Power in itself need not be a problem: it can be used 
defensively and justly. But, in any case, merely offering or withholding benefits to obtain legal 
and moral cooperation (in the “workplace”, “family”, etc.) is not exercising the stick of power 
but the carrot of influence. Therefore, EFL is not “redefining what is at issue” (80). It is simply 
stating what the issue is in EFL (very broadly, at least, for the specific issue is philosophically 
explaining and defending an extreme version of the, implicit, Classical Liberal—or 
libertarian—Compatibility Thesis: liberty, welfare, and anarchy do not clash). It is not up to a 
review to decide what the thesis should have been instead. Moreover, the rest of the book is 
not, even stipulatively, “redefining” the key terms of ‘rationality’, ‘liberty’, ‘welfare’, and 
‘anarchy’. Rather, it explains and defends particular theories—or conceptions—of these things 
as plausible and compatible; which is an entirely different matter. Describing this as mere 
2 
 
“word play” (80) is a hallmark of philosophical philistinism. When people encounter a 
philosophical argument without a good grasp of what philosophy is, they can see it is not 
science and so often invalidly assume that it is only arguing about the usage of words. 
As a note to quoting the Compatibility Thesis, the review states that it is “a bit remarkable” to 
see a “utopian anarcho-libertarian theory … rejecting … ‘imaginary cases’” (n. 11). More or 
less libertarian societies have existed, not least in Iceland and Ireland (and we might say that, 
politically, libertarianism always exists in the interstices of state interference). But the point 
the review is misunderstanding is that the Compatibility Thesis is intended to be practical. 
Therefore, it is not relevant that certain clashes in liberty, welfare, and anarchy are merely 
logically possible (although they certainly are). 
The review expresses surprise that there is perfect interpersonal liberty where “no other person 
exists besides ourselves!” This is a vacuously true starting point added for logical 
completeness. It asks, “But what is interpersonal about this?” (80). Libertarian liberty is 
theorised as the absence of interpersonally imposed costs (constraints on want-satisfaction). 
There clearly cannot be any interpersonal imposition if there is only one person, therefore that 
person has perfect (or complete) interpersonal liberty. If X is explained as being the absence 
of Y, and Y is absent, then X. (Or, by analogy, suppose that there is—albeit similarly 
vacuously—‘perfect interspecies animal peace’1 on some island where there is only one animal 
species, because it is explained as ‘the absence of any interspecies animal conflict’. It would 
be a logical confusion to ask, ‘But what is interspecies about this?’) 
EFL defends ‘welfare’ as the want-satisfaction of unimposed wants, as the review appears to 
grasp. But it then says, “In other words, ‘welfare’ is about the instant actualisation of immediate 
preferences, rather than one’s satisfactory mental and physical health” (80). That does not 
follow at all, as EFL makes plain. First, it is about obtaining more of what we want overall (not 
“instant actualisation” but in the long term). Second, if having better “mental and physical 
health” promotes that for someone, then that is indeed for the good of his welfare. Although, if 
he would rather trade some portion of these for other ends—as we all do to varying extents—
then he would be worse off from his point of view if we were to prevent him.2 If the review 
disagrees, then it needs to explain how it knows just the right amount of these things that 
everyone ought to trade off against the other ends they have in life whether they want it or not. 
The review goes on to assert that EFL has here “made welfare compatible with liberty by 
simply redefining welfare to resemble liberty” (81). This is clearly false. This is a theory of 
welfare that is hardly unique to EFL: it is at least partly the sense used in welfare economics 
and it is entirely the sense used in preference utilitarianism (from whence it was taken). Neither 
of these are interpreted by their advocates or their critics as “simply redefining welfare to 
resemble liberty”. Moreover, it is defended throughout the chapter in the light of an abundance 
of criticisms. There is no attempt to dismiss these criticisms merely by referring back to, or 
covertly using, the ‘definition’ (actually a theory). It is not practical to go through all the 
examples here, but one fundamental aspect is that it is the theory of welfare that each person is 
likely to accept for himself (but paternalists are likely to waive it for ‘irrational’ other people). 
Furthermore, it is clear that this view of welfare could in principle significantly clash with 
liberty: it is logically possible that 1) individuals freely and systematically do what gives them 
 
1 We might even imagine that this is a goal of some vegan organisation out to police the entire animal kingdom. 
2 Having said this, the only sense of “mental … health” (strictly a category mistake, as Thomas Szasz makes clear 
in so many of his books, not least The Myth of Mental Illness) that might be defended for EFL purposes is of our 
brain behaving as we want. 
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less of what they want overall (in the long term), and 2) state redistribution and regulation could 
increase overall want-satisfaction. Of course, EFL holds that there are philosophical as well as 
empirical reasons that these two possibilities are false. But this requires arguments, which EFL 
gives in light of the best and of typical criticisms. It should be clear that “simply redefining 
welfare” is not the method. 
In the final chapter on anarchy, which is mistaken to be a “conclusion”, the review quotes the 
opening sentence: “Private-property anarchy is better than the state in the enhancement of 
liberty and welfare”. It then says, “Again, anarchy would be best if liberty is understood as the 
absence of all constraints and welfare is understood as best enhanced through one’s living in a 
state of negative freedom” (81). As this “Again” does not introduce an accurate paraphrase of 
what even the review had to say before, it requires a separate response. To be clear, ‘anarchy’ 
means ‘not being ruled’. It does not mean ‘having no rules or laws’ (that is ‘anomie’) or ‘no 
constraints’, as EFL explains. And, in EFL, ‘liberty’ is nothing like the “absence of all 
constraints”. It is the absence of proactive impositions by other people. EFL explains and 
defends its independent theories of these things as well as their compatibility. The review 
ignores these arguments because it mistakenly assumes that this is all overwhelmingly due to 
persuasive or stipulative definitions. It is not entirely clear what the review intends by “negative 
freedom”, but that expression (and ‘negative liberty’) is barely used in EFL (only pages 128-
130) and this reply has already explained the two crucial ways that welfare as overall want-
satisfaction could in principle clash with liberty. The review’s “disappointment” is mainly 
caused by its mistakenly perceiving philosophical arguments as “word play”. 
According to the review, EFL “tells us not to worry about the absence of a law-enforcement 
body bringing about societal chaos” (81). Where? “Absence”? On the contrary, with private-
property anarchy there would in all likelihood be more than one “law-enforcement body” 
competitively improving services; unlike the chaos of the state’s coercively imposed monopoly 
of ‘law and order’. EFL gives several references to the relevant literature in the endnote and 
discusses similar issues, such as libertarian restitution, elsewhere in the book. A careless 
reading seems to have given the review the interpretation that there won’t be any police, courts, 
etc., to defend people and their external property. When EFL writes of “a generally libertarian 
culture” being necessary for a libertarian society, it does not imply that everyone will then 
spontaneously behave themselves. And that libertarianism must be what the majority want, 
does not mean that what they get will thereby be “majoritarian” in any “tyrannical” sense 
(although the review’s final sentence is obscure on this topic). 
The introduction to EFL admits that its author holds libertarianism as a moral value. EFL 
asserts that, nevertheless, it is defending a non-moral thesis (the Compatibility Thesis) with 
non-moral arguments. But the review “finds it difficult to take Lester seriously” and it is “not 
persuaded that this account is non-moral” (81). The review’s fallacy implies that a scientist 
who morally disapproves of smoking must thereby somehow involve morality in his research 
articles on smoking. The review was free to cite an example of EFL somehow engaging in 
moral advocacy, but it fails to do so. Instead, it asserts that “any position regarding the 
organization of human beings—or the natural environment—is a moral position …” (81). But 
EFL is not taking any such “position”. It is not arguing for the implementation of any “positions 
or principles”. In EFL’s defence of the Compatibility Thesis, it does not advocate that anything 
be done. It only examines the philosophical and, to a lesser extent, empirical relationships 
among liberty, welfare, and anarchy. One of the most important tools of philosophy is 
separating conflated ideas in order to clarify the implications of each. There appears to be more 
than a suggestion in the review of the fallacy that research (here involving “the organization of 
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human beings”) cannot be ‘value-free’ (more precisely, values can only be in the mind; 
although value theories and arguments can be expressed objectively). Perhaps this accounts for 
its conflation. 
The review then cites as an alleged “further example” (81) EFL’s view that “moral values must 
be obeyed because if disobeyed they are, ipso facto, not held categorically”. This is not an 
example either, for this is part of the analysis of what morals are and how they square with the 
conception of rationality that is being defended. It is what is sometimes called ‘meta-ethics’. It 
does not morally advocate anything. EFL explains this well-known distinction and how it is 
clearly possible to discuss the nature of morals without taking a ‘moral position’ on any 
particular moral issue (39). Why does the review conflate these two things? The review then 
goes on, using the example of unknown or unconsented-to extramarital affairs, to ask whether 
it is “not conceivable to assume” that the people engaged in it “at the time of their affair were 
cognizant of the fact that what they were doing was wrong …?” In other words, the review 
ignores the arguments given explaining exactly how this common-sense view is mistaken 
(which it would make this reply too long to repeat). Instead of attempting to show exactly where 
the arguments have gone wrong, the review in effect simply asks whether it is “not conceivable 
to assume” that the common-sense view is correct. Has the review really grasped what 
philosophy is supposed to be about? ‘I reply to your philosophical arguments against a 
common-sense view by assuming that common-sense view’? 
The review continues to ignore the arguments in EFL and asserts that we can tell a lie knowing 
that it is immoral to do so at the time we tell it. It explains: 
When we lie, do we not—at least sometimes—feel guilty about it later, if not at the 
time we speak it? Is not this recognition that we acted contrary to how we ought to have 
acted an instance of moral self-awareness? (81-82) 
So, this ‘explanation’ is precisely not of us doing what we feel to be wrong at the time of action. 
EFL also mentions this type of case and various similar possible confusions. Why does the 
review ignore them? Again, where is the hint of philosophical analysis in its restatement of the 
conventional view? The review also conflates, without argument or explanation, the crucial 
distinction EFL makes between knowledge of moral theory (what it is) and what is felt to be 
moral or immoral. It concludes that EFL has embraced an “awkward proposition” (82). So 
what if it is “awkward”? What is wrong, exactly, with the specific arguments? The review has 
again taken a relatively small point, and out of its context in the compatibility thesis, and failed 
to say anything useful, interesting, or relevant about it. 
It is not in any way part of EFL’s “conception of liberty”, as the review mistakenly asserts, but 
the theory of ‘action’ and ‘rationality’ that “to act at all is to do what one most desires, most 
wants, or thinks it best to do” under the perceived circumstances and at that time. The review 
then quotes EFL on free will, which is also not part of the theory of interpersonal liberty. It 
states, “on this account gluttons and smokers are to be understood as being just as ‘free’ as 
those who can curb their appetites and resist addiction” (82). Their wills are just as free: no one 
is proactively imposing this on them. “More troublesome …”, but why was that 
“troublesome”? Only because it conflicts with the review’s prior common-sense theories so it 
can ignore the philosophical arguments, apparently. Nor is EFL’s theory of free will a 
“definition”, as it asserts. The review interprets every theory as a “definition” and then 
complains that EFL is merely redefining terms. If “there are numerous examples from 
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psychology which might damage the credibility of this claim” (the theory of free will), then 
why not cite at least one of them? 
The review then comes up with this piece of typical ‘reasoning’: 
In some instances our will may be all that we possess. However, the idea that our will 
creates our personality and expresses our desires and that we might not have control 
over our personality and desires, yet have a free will, strikes me as contradictory. (82) 
How can our will be “all that we possess”? Have we no bodies? How is what we possess 
relevant to the issue anyway? Who says “our will creates our personality”, apart from the 
review? Why is it even implicitly inconsistent (for it is not “contradictory”: A & ~A) exactly 
that “we might not have control over our personality and desires, yet have a free will”? What 
is wrong exactly with the explanation given in EFL apart from the fact that it clashes with how 
it “strikes” the review? Why does the review systematically avoid philosophical argument? 
The review’s confusion about definitions continues with the assertion that, “Throughout, Lester 
has been attempting to redefine libertarianism” (82). Perhaps an analogy can help here. To try 
to capture and clarify the implicit libertarian conception of liberty is no more an attempt to 
“redefine” it than an attempt to come up with a more precise theory of the composition of the 
sun is an attempt to “redefine” the sun. In both cases there is already something there that we 
are trying to understand better. The review states that EFL’s comment that libertarians view 
liberty as the “voluntary interaction of persons rather than selfish individualism” is its “account 
of liberty” (82) and part of its ‘redefinition’. No, that merely indicates what libertarians are 
getting at in contradistinction to the caricature set up by some anti-libertarians. The review then 
discusses a passage on individualism and families, which it mistakenly assumes “develops this 
account” of liberty. In observing the fact that the state undermines families and replaces fathers, 
EFL was implying nothing about its author’s views on the role of the father in families—as the 
review infers. Therefore, it is irrelevant for the review to call this imagined implication 
“controversial” (but what’s wrong with that, anyway?), “perhaps sexist” (but what’s wrong 
with that, anyway?), and “in need of some justification” (supporting justifications are 
epistemologically impossible, as Karl Popper explained). EFL is here replying to John Gray’s 
point at greater length than it was made and with references to relevant empirical work. Why 
should it offer a more-detailed explanation than it does? It cites Ferdinand Mount’s Subversive 
Family, as the review notes, but also the considerable canon of Patricia Morgan’s (although 
one work in particular). Why should EFL rehearse all their empirical work instead of 
continuing with the philosophy beneath it all, which is what EFL is primarily about? If the 
review wants to grasp the empirical literature, then it should consult the books instead of 
complaining that EFL offers “no such further explanation of any of these claims” (82). The 
review quotes out of context where EFL admits that the answers to Gray will not “convince 
those who are sympathetic to any of his points”. For it is then explained that this is because of 
the lack of any detail in Gray’s assertions and that relevant empirical literature has been cited. 
What is the worth of the claim that the “book’s chapters are a bit uneven running between 
eleven and ninety one pages” (83)? The first chapter is in fact ten pages: it is only an 
introduction. The longest chapter is in fact ninety-two pages. As might be expected, the longest 
chapter is on liberty; dealing with the majority of the philosophical problems. Chapters ought 
to be just as long as they need to be to do the job required. The procrustean view of chapter 
length is bizarre. Why is it an “imbalance” that the chapter on liberty is very long and the one 
on anarchy is very short? It is explained in the anarchy chapter exactly why it is short: there 
6 
 
are just a few philosophical points left to make and some typical biases to reply to, because 
most of the work on private-property anarchy has already arisen more naturally in the chapter 
on liberty. It would have been foolish to put those points into the anarchy chapter just to make 
the chapter lengths more even. 
The review notes EFL’s many “critiques for opposing viewpoints, but … wonders if many of 
them are no more than strawmen” (83). If the review is really without any background in any 
of the “opposing viewpoints”, why idly wonder rather than check some of them? We have seen 
that the review’s targets are strawmen. The reason that EFL “concedes” (as the review puts it) 
that it seems “better to be ‘too quick’ than ‘too slow’” is because it is always likely that anti-
philosophical responses will miss the point, no matter how much it is laboured (and because 
there are so many issues to deal with). The review also notes the admission that EFL “cannot 
possibly guess which points will prove the most controversial and for what reasons” and so 
must press on looking forward to helpful criticism of the book. It is an irony that the review 
interprets this as admitting that EFL “knowingly treads along at surface level” and that it has 
avoided “greater reflection and comments by colleagues” (83). Would that the review could 
even get to grips with the surface. Drafts of EFL received many astute criticisms throughout 
and they certainly helped to clarify a wide variety of points. The review apparently doubts that 
this happened, despite the acknowledgments. The more-eminent readers of EFL have tended 
to rate it highly, including Professors Antony Flew, Jan Narveson, Norman Barry, John Gray, 
and even Brian Barry—who admitted that he found it “hard to fault the philosophical 
arguments”3 (but the relevant empirical social science is largely assumed arguendo in order 
that the philosophical arguments can then explain it). The review, footnote 26, strangely 
interprets as being an admitted failing the merely logical point that it is impossible to deal with 
the unlimited number of “possible criticisms of want-satisfaction as a view of welfare”. And 
the review has ignored the criticisms that were dealt with. 
It is mistaken, and irrelevant to its objective thesis, to state that EFL’s “motivation” is a “deep 
dissatisfaction with the structure of contemporary Western-liberal society” (83). As a matter of 
fact, the motivation was eventually coming to accept the social-scientific evidence for 
libertarianism but seeing that all the philosophical arguments for it were hopelessly confused 
(much of both types of literature are listed in the bibliography). Hence, EFL refers to the social 
science—as being mainly presupposed—but focusses on the philosophical aspects. If readers 
are unfamiliar with the cited empirical literature and not prepared to read it, or insufficiently 
familiar with philosophy and not, at least, prepared to read the arguments carefully, then they 
are likely to be objectively confused by EFL (even if they don’t feel confused). All that said, 
to put it in the review’s terms, it might be clearer to say that EFL’s aim is to philosophically 
explain the counterproductive consequences of state interference with “contemporary Western-
liberal society”. EFL is not anti-Western or anti-liberal (in the classical sense, of course). 
To what, imagined, “costs of the West’s industrial revolution” is the review alluding? Despite 
the illiberal Acts of Enclosure and twenty-two years of state war—1793-1815—the Industrial 
Revolution eventually enabled working hours and pay to become better than in agriculture and 
continue to improve. What have the “debts being acquired by the third world” to do with free 
markets? The review wants more than “bold assurances that history would not repeat itself”. 
However, history is repeating itself in the less-developed countries of the world; and that is just 
what they need to get them out of poverty permanently. The review then asserts that the state 
has improved, and the “‘free market’” has failed, the “educational system” (even though, for 
 
3 Personal communication. 
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instance, there is now around 20% functional illiteracy among school leavers?), “transport 
systems” (even though, for instance, there are far fewer miles of railways in the UK than when 
the system was first nationalised?), “the arts” (seriously?), the “environment” (even though, 
for instance, political intervention has typically prevented people from suing for negative 
environmental effects on their persons and property?), “child-labour” (even though this helps 
families in countries not yet well developed?) and “overtime for workers” (even though 
working hours generally decrease without state intervention as wages rise in freer economies?). 
The review asserts that “anarcho-capitalist conceptions need to engage these concerns at a 
much deeper level”. These “concerns” are the ignorant orthodoxies fostered by state 
‘education’. The main problem being the, corrupt and grossly inefficient, state monopolies of 
the university-and-degree systems all over the world. It is not possible to deal in detail here 
with the review’s empirical falsehoods. Many relevant works are listed in EFL’s bibliography. 
J. C. Lester September 2002 (revised February 2021) 
